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I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF STUDY
'The right of belligerents
to adopt means of Injuring
the enemy is not unlimited."
Hague Convention No. IV
Does law have anything to do with var and war with law"? Hany in-
dividuals believe that the tern f*iar u connotes an abandonment of basic
rules of behavior by substituting in their place reliance on force; while
law implies a system where human behavior, relationships, and values are
governed by inescapable rules. It comes as a surprise to many people to
learn that there is an international law of war. This body of law at-
tempts to impose minimum restraints upon international violence in the
interest of the world community. The question, t-hich asks the relation-
ship of law to war and war to law, is not just academic, but of substan-
tive and vital importance, to every military commander, as a violator of
the laws of v,ar my , depending upon the factual situation: be tried by
the enemy , his own state, or by 3n international tribun I,
The purpose of this study is to analyze and discuss some of the
major juridical issues relating to the Geneva Convention for the Ameli-
oration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked members
of the Armed Forces at Sea (Sea Convention). This Convention is of
great importance and significance and represents a great step forward
in the development of the law of naval warfare. The writer hopes that
this paper will perform an informative function in assisting na.'^l per-
sonnel in better under standing of the laws of war in general and in par-
ticular the Sea Convention, its humanitarian considerations, anJ its
relationship to the three other Geneva Conventions for Protection of
War Victims of 19^9.
1

II. CLAIMS LIMITING NAVAL WARFARE; ORIGIN
AND PROGRESSIVE DEVELOPMENT
A. HUMANITARIAN CONCEPTS:
Over the ages three basic principles have evolved which are often
referred to as the foundation of the contemporary rules of civilized
warfare. They are humanity, military necessity, and chivalry. It is
the writer's opinion that humanity is the most important of these prin-
ciples. Professor Ma Hi son, Professor of Law at George Washington Uni-
versity, has written that, "Humanitarian considerations and acts must be
encouraged in every practical way even though they have had a secondary
3
role to military necessity in combat situations." It cannot be over
emphasized that humanity is the basis for many of the present prohibi-
tions imposed on belligerents for the purpose of restraining the use of
unnecessary violence in conducting war.
Accordingly, mi li tary^ necessi ty is not an all encompassing, permis-
sive principle. It permits a belligerent to apply only that amount of
force, not otherwise prohibited by the law of war, required for a partial
or complete submission of the enemy with the least expenditure of time,
life, and physical resources. The rules of international law and in
particular the principle of humanity is superior to military necessity
-- military necessity is not a defense for lawlessness in the conduct of
war. The concept of military necessity may and is often times restricted
in its application by rules of law. The position that the laws of war
are subject to, and limited by, the operation of the principle of mili-
tary necessity has not been widely accepted for many years , in fact one
of the War Crimes Tribunals' following World War II in rejecting this

argument stated that: "To claim that they (customary rules of war) can
be wantonly - and at the sole discretion of any one belligerent - dis-
regarded when he considers his own situation to be critical, means noth-
5ing more or less than to abrogate the laws and customs of war entirely.' 5
The two principles, humanity and military necessity, may be described
as complementing each other, not opposing. The principle of military ne-
cessity implies the principle of humanity which disallows any kind or
degree of force not essential to obtain the objective sought; that is
force which needlessly or unnecessarily causes or aggravates both human
suffering and physical destruction. It is suggested that the two prin-
ciples be thought of as elements of a "larger composite practice which
comprises both military necessity and humanity,"
The principle of chivalry is sometimes included as one of the basic
principles of the law of war even though it appears to be a relic of the
Middle Ages when combat was often times regulated by formalistic rules.
In general, this principle prohibits the employment of treacherous means
7
or expedients, such as the improper use of a truce flag. However, chiv-
alry should not be confused with stratagems or ruses of war which are
lawful. An example of a legitimate ruse would be for a warship to use
false colors, disguise her outward appearance and even pose as a merchant
ship, however, in such cases and prior to opening fire the proper naval
q
ensign must be hoisted. In contrast to ships which may fly a false flag,
the attitudes and practices of belligerents during World War I and II




Even though stratagems and ruses are legal., it it noted that a war-
ship may not improperly employ the red cross emblem (or other distinctive
protective emblems) which is used to indicate hospital craft, medical air-
craft, medical units, and medical personnel and materials. It is a
violation of the Sea Convention to use ships and aircraft which are pro-
tec ted by one of the protective emblems for any military purpose. As
it is unlawful to wrongfully employ the red cross emblem, it is equally
unlawful for ships to transmit false distress signals and distress mes-
sages which are indispensable to the safety of navigation which is neces-
13
sary for preventing the col lision, stranding or loss of ships or aircraft.
It is submitted that in contemporary warfare the principle of chiv-
alry has merged with the principle of humanity. As in modern warfare the
principle of chivalry is largely the application of the humani tari an con-
cepts of fairplay; and the refraining from the use of dishonorable means,
Ik
expedients or conduct between opposing forces.
For a full understanding of the many contemporary problems relating
to the law of war as it pertains to the humane treatment of war victims
background knowledge of the past is essential. History has established
precedents which provide the knowledge necessary to shed light on pre-
paration for the future.
War has constantly occupied the activity of man throughout his tenure
on this planet. Thus, it is not surprising that over the centuries a con-
siderable amount of law has evolved around the subject. However, for many
centuries war was governed only by the law of the jungle, that is by no
law at all as the concept of law is thought of in the contemporary science

of jurisprudence. As civilization developed so did the methods of con-
ducting war; war became more destructive and deadly.
I . From the Beginning of Timet Pre-I9th Century Developments
In antiquity, war was waged with all the cruelty of which human fiend-
ishness is capable* Primitive roan and his barbarian descendant annihilated
or enslaved all foeman who were captured or left injured or weaponless on
the field of battle. In time it became the practice of the conqueror
to hold a captured headman or leader as a hostage for ransom. Such a
victim was tot. According to Scripture, he was freed by the forces of
J5
Abraham - perhaps the earliest prisoner-rescue on record.
Generally, it can be said that the vanquished of the ancient world
usually faced extermination. One finds in Samuel t "Thus saith the Lord
of Hosts...go and smite Araaiek and utterly destroy all they have, and
16
spare them not." Saul was considered disobedient because he took a few
17
Amleklte prisoners. ' Six centuries later Hemocritus of Syracuse was ex-
iled for refusing to slaughter all Athenian captives. Curing antiquity,
there were some members of mankind who had a conscience »nd provided
humane treatment to captives, an example was India where the ancient Codes
of Menu (about 200 8. C.) enjoined Hindu warriors from doing injury to
13
any defenseless or subdued enemy. There are of course other specific
examples of particular leaders or nations extending basic humanitarian
principles to enemy war victims. This was the exception rather than the
general practice, however.

The Romans sported v4 th their war-prisoners , often using them for
target practice or gladiatorial shows. Prisoners were tortured for public
amusement. Enslaved enemy warriors rowed Caesar's naval galleys to North
Africa and Britain, and were killed when they could no longer pull an oar.
"Slay and slay on." the Roman General Germanicus ordered his Rhineiand
invaders. "Oo not take prisoners: We will have no peace until all are
19destroyed." ' However, in time the Romans realized that the wanton slaugh-
ter of prisoners of war mm an economic loss. Thus, not because of feel-
ings of humanity or mercy , it became a wide spread practice that captives
were placed in slavery.
As man and civilization developed so did man's method of conducting
war. Warfare remained as destructive, but those who conducted war saw
that there were advantages in observing some restraints provided the
20
enemy did likewise. The influence of Christianity and the development
of the laws of chivalry led to changes and development of some concepts
of humanity in the treatment of war victims by conquering nations.
Even though the Christian influence was important in the development
of the laws of war, it in some aspects delayed the wide spread acceptance
of universal rules of war. From the early 5th to 17th centuries much em-
phasis of Christian nations and writers was on the "just war" concept,
'He who 9ocs t0 war justly - that is to say with good cause and in ac-
cordance with morality - can do anything he pleases to nationals of the
Z\
enemy country." The end result was that each belligerent looked upon
his cause to be the only one "just" and massacred at will. Also
Christianity had formulated the admirable doctrine of love for one's

fellow man, but that doctrine was often forgotten in wars between Christ-
ians and non-Christians. The doctrine was often deformed by men who viewed
altruism as a way of ensuring their own salvation and applied its precepts
only in wars with those of the same faith. In fact, all too often it was
non-Christians in wars with Christians that displayed the most humanity.
It was not until the fn li^htenment that the "just war" concept lost
its significance and humanitarianism really came into being. The Christ-
ian nations of the world began to realize that there were certain basic
humanitarian principles which were binding on all belligerents regardless
of the religion or nationality or the parties to the conflict, or to the
cause responsible for the hostilities. As the principle of a "just war"
began to fade into obscurity, the concept developed that, "yar must be
ft
waged in a proper' way that useless suffering should be avoided." How-
ever, it was not until the 17th century that the soldier found a notable
spokesman in a Dutch lawyer, Hugo Grotius. Grotius attempted to devise
a set of rules which combatant nation- could follow to mutual advanta
however, his efforts to humanize warfare by legal means did not meet with
immediate success. ? But his efforts did plant th# seed, publicize the
problem and place it on humanity's conscience.
Once the principle of respect for the human person -- regard for his
life, liberty, and happiness -- had been planted, belligerents began to
enter into cartels v which pertained to the exchange of prisoners of war,
armistices, capitulations for the surrender of fortresses, and the treat-
ment of the wounded and sick. These agreements were generally of limited
duration or applicable to a particular battle.

Even though Grotius and his disciples had introduced huraani tari ani sra
into international law, it retrained for the 17th century philosophers
Montesquieu and Rousseau to develop further humanitarian concepts as ap-
plied to the law of war. Rousseau wrote that:
War is not a relationship
between one man and an-
other; but between one
State and another, in war,
individuals are enemies
only by accident, not as
men but as soldiers...
Since the end of war is
the destruction oftthe
enemy State, one is en-
titled to kill its defend-
ers so long as they bear
arms; but as soon as they
lay down their weapons or
surrender .. they become
men once more, and one no
longer has any right over
thei r 1 i ves ... -^7
As Montesquieu and Rousseau had laid the ground work it remained
for events emerging from the American and French Revolutions to lead to
pronounced &nd significant changes in the law of war. During the American
Revolution, the British refused to treat captured American naval person-
nel as prisoners of war even though such status was accorded to captured
members of the Continental Army. J After the revolution, the United States
made an attempt to regulate the treatment of captured personnel by bi-
29
lateral treaties with several countries. These treaties laid down
rules for the protection of prisoners and the sick and wounded, but
these Conventions were merely agreements between two states and not a>n
international treaty binding on other states. This was at most a piece-
meal approach to a most pressing and difficult problem.
S

The French Legislative Assembly, in 1792, enacted a formal code of
humanitarian principles governing the treatment of prisoners of war.
This code provided in part that:
(1) Prisoners of war are
under the protection of
the French Nation.
(2) All cruel acts, al
1
violence, and all insults
committed against a pris-
oner of war shall be pun-
ished as if committed
against a French citizen.
(3) All prisoners of war
shall be transported to
special places in the rear
of the army for which pur-
pose the commanding generals
shall have designated speci-
fic areas. 3°
2* Humani tarianism, Important In the Evolution of Conventional Law; Post
19th Century Developments
31
The French Code was ahead of the times and was rejected by the
other nations of the world. However, by the middle of the 19th century
the nations of the world realized that maltreatment of prisoners of war
and the sick and wounded was an anachronism that had to be abandoned.
However, it was not until the Battle of Solferino in 1359 where 3'3,000
officers and men were wounded within a space of fifteen hours and the
American Civil War where single engagements were producing casualties in
excess of 20,000 men, that the humanitarian conscience of mankind was
suddenly awakened to the great inadequacy of the existing law of war.
During the American Civil War and other wars of Europe in the 1350 's and

1360'$ many of the sick and wounded could have been saved by prompt medf-
32
cal care had it been available.
It took awhi le for the humanitarian conscience of mankind to be a-
wakened, but once it had been awakened, individual nations, private in-
dividuals and international conferences attempted to establish procedures
which would lessen the suffering of victims of war, The first major mul-
tilateral convention pertaining to the treatment of war victims whic
became universal in character was the Convention for the Amelioration
of the Condition of Soldiers Wounded in Armed Forces In the Field of 136*4
(Convention of 136U). It is surprising to note that this Convention
was not applicable to naval warfare. In fact, throughout the evolution
of the customary law of war, naval warfare seems to have been neglected.
It would seem to this writer that the customary laws of war of the time
which related to the protection of humanitarian values would have applied
to hostilities at sea, however, such generally was not the case. Even
in the development of the conventional law of war, naval warfare was gen-
erally neglected. It was not until after the Naval Battles of Lissa and
Mobile Bay that it became tragically apparent that the lack of organized
medical aid and standards of protection had caused the needless death of
3*4
many combatants. That in 1363, an international conference for the
purpose of extending and adopting the Convention of 136^ to naval warfare
35
was convened. This conference drafted and approved fifteen articles,
nine of which pertained to warfare at sea, which became known as the
"Additional Articles of 1363."
The "Additional Articles" received favorable response from many na-
36
tlons and were acceded to by the United States and several other nations.
10

However, the validity of the accessions was doubtful and the Swiss Gov-
ernment, the depository for the ratifications, never considered the
'•Additional Articles" as a treaty. Fven though the "Additional Articles"
never achieved the status of a treaty, a number of countries including
the United States, agreed to adopt and observe the, "Application on the
seas of the humane principles laid down in the Geneva Convention" (refer-
ring to the Additional Articles), during periods of hostilities.
Between 1369 and 1399 the matter of extending the principles of the
Convention of 136** to naval warfare was discussed ®nd studied on several
occasions by International Conferences of the Red Cross. However, it
was not until 1899 at the First International Peace Conference, at the
Hague, that the humanitarian principles of the Convention of 186*» were
adapted to maritime warfare and incorporated in the Third Convention of
the Hague of 1399 for the Adaptation to Maritime warfare of the Principles
of the 136*4 Convention (Third Convention o 1399). This Convention,
which was ratified by a number of states, was a great improvement over
the "Additional Articles" as it eliminated many ambiguities and clearly
provided that all hospital ships were exempt from capture.
The Third Convention was subsequently revised. The revision was
entitled The Tenth Convention of the Hague of 1907 for the Adoption to
Maritime Warfare of the Principles of the Geneva Convention (Tenth Con-
vention). This Convention consisted of 23 articles and was a vast im-
provement over the Third Convention as it was no longer modeled on the
186** Convention, but on a revision of the 136** Convention which had taken
place In 1906 and which was much more sophisticated. An item of particu-
lar importance contained in the Tenth Convention, not included in the
11

Third Convention, was a requirement that signatories take the necessary
steps, by way of their criminal law, to protect against individual acts
hi
of pillage and ill treatment against the sick and wounded.
It is surprising to note that the delegates to the Hague Conferences
of 1399 and 1907 , which conferences were responsible for the drafting of
the Third and Tenth Conventions, were not as concerned with humanitarian
aspects or the permanent establishment of peace as they were concerned
with the regulation of warfare. v#»at humanitarian principles that were
adopted by these conferences and incorporated into treaties were for the
most part ancillary to the main motivation of the conference, which was
the regulation and limitation of weapons, explosives, and warships.
The Tenth Convention was in force for both World Wars. However, by
the time of World War I, the methods of naval warfare had changed so
drastically that in many ways the Convention was obsolete. Unfortunately
the framcrs of the Conventton were unable to forsee the many technologi-
cal advances that were to be made in naval warfare - the long range naval
engagement, the increased capabilities and endurance of the submarine,
and the airplane. The author's of the Third and Tenth Conventions drafted
these treaties in accordance with 19th century naval action which was
fought at close range with bloody carnage and the consequent need for
rendering aid swiftly to the sick, wounded, and shipwrecked. The drafters
had envisioned that hospital ships would accompany the fleet to sea and
after an engagement would render aid to those in need. The fraraers of
these Conventions believed that the consequences of naval warfare were
confined to the combatants on either side and they alone needed protec-
ts
tion. It is true that prior to World War I the law of warfare *
12

Including naval warfare - had developed a set of principles which be-
cause of humanitarian considerations, recognized that combatants and
non-combatants formed two classes of persons entitled to different types
of treatment at the hands of the armed forces of an enemy state. The
civilian population and their private affairs were, in the ordinary
course of events, relatively unaffected by the fact that their nation was
at war, unless they were living where actual hostilities were taking
place Therefore, out of a consideration of humanity and since the civil-
ian contribution to the war effort was indirect and less than total, it
was considered as non-combatant and so long as i t refrained from actively
participating in hostilities, it was not made the object of direct attack.
Included in the non-combatant category was the merchant marine. Although
enemy merchant ships have always been subject to capture, they were not
objects of direct attack (unless there were exceptional circumstances),
they could be destroyed after capture only if it was necessary and the
fcf
passengers and crew had been safely provided for.
Beginning with viorld War I, many new developments placed a great
strain on established principles of naval warfare. The emergence of the
concept of "total war u and the technological and tactical advancements
which had been made in naval warfare created many new tensions and pres-
sures which had not been contemplated by the drafters of the Tenth Con-
vention.
The Allied Powers had a superiority of naval ships and weapons and
for the most part had control of the seas. Because of the Allied naval
superiority the Allies were able to control the flow of qoo^Js and materials
destined for Germany by sea. However , even though the Central Powers had
13

little effective surface sea power, they did have a sizeable submarine
force. In retaliation for British action in declaring the North Sea a
military zone, and the laying of the North Sea Mine Barrage, the Central
Powers declared the waters adjacent to the British Isles a war zone.
The declaration was accompanied by a statement that enemy merchant ships
would be attacked without warning in such areas. German submarines
were very active in the waters surrounding the British Isles and several
merchant ships were attacked which resulted in great loss of life. Also
several Allied hospital ships transporting the sick and wounded from a
theater of war to a place of safety were attacked and sunk by submarines
belonging to the Central Powers, resulting in great loss of life. The
Allies, in order to protect their hospital and merchant ships from attack
by submarines, provided such ships with military escorts.
The Central Powers in response to claims that they were in violation
of the laws of war in general and the Tenth Convention in particular,
alleged that the policy of the Allies in intercepting neutral shipping
destined for Germany was illegal j that the arming and convoying of mer-
chant vessels changed the status of such vessels from non-combatants to
combatants; that vessels navigating in a "war zone" have assumed the risk;
and that hospital ships were being used to transport troops and munitions.
The Central Powers also contended that a submarine was unable to avail
itself of the opportunity to inspect merchant and hospital ships and
that unrestricted submarine warfare was justified because of the accepted
ruse of displaying false colors and other difficulties of identification
of the true nationality of a merchant ship.
1*4

During World War I the Central Powers had a smaller stake in the
maintenance of the Tenth Convention and therefore interpreted it very
50
narrowly It is also pointed out that the conduct of the Allies re-
garding the Convention was not always in compliance with its provisions.
Generally, It can be said that In <torld War I, for all practical purposes,
the humanitarian influence of the Tenth Convention was not great and
basic humanitarian concepts which had taken so long to develop were dealt
a serious setback.
During World War II the numerous belligerents made some humanitarian
concessions in interpreting the Tenth Convention as i t pertained to hos-
pital ships. The Convention was interpreted so that a hospital ship
could transport not only the sick and wounded of the armed forces and
their dependents but also injured seamen. However, the protection of
the Convention was not generally extended to sick and wounded civilians.
It would seem that as a matter of both logic and common humanity the pro-
tection of the Convention oertaining to hospital ships would have been
extended to civilian-*
Even though tha belligerents in /.Md War II made a gallant effort
to honor the Tenth Convention In so far 3i it pertained to hospital ships,
there were alleged violations of the Convention by both sides and several
hospital ships were attacked, However, several of the attacks can be
attributed to the fact that the ships were inadequately marked, even
though marked in accordance with the requirementsoof the Convention. It
is noted that the provisions of the Tenth Convention pertaining to mark-
ings of hospital ships were inadequate for the high level bomber or dis-
52
tant submarine. There is little evidence to show that attacks on
15

hospital ships in World War II were other than accidental and the result
of faulty recognition.
The effort of the belligerents in World War II to protect hospital
ships is overshadowed by the unrestricted submarine warfare practiced by
53both sides. The belligerents generally refrained from rescuing sur-
vivors of torpedoed ships, There are several reported instances that the
5& 55
crews of Japanese and German submarines went so far as to murder sur-
viving crews of torpedoed ships. Generally, it can be said that the
conduct of both sides regarding submarine warfare was a violation of the
Tenth Convention which provided, in part, that "After every engagement...
belligerents so far as military interest permit, shall take steps to look
for the shipwrecked, sick, and wounded and to protect them against. . .i 1
1
56
treatment." The phrase, "so far as military interest shall permit,"
was construed very broadly and for the most part seem to have been ignored,
B. GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 19^9
Prior to the inception of World War II, it was apparent that the
existing customary and conventional law relating to war victims,wwas in
many aspects deficient. After the end of World War I and prior to 19*»0,
several international conferences had considered the existing law of war
as it pertained to war victims In 1929 some changes were made to the




on land. However, the Tenth Convention which was in desperate need of
revision remained unchanged. The Swiss Government called a Diplomatic
Conference to be convened in 19**0- Revision of the Tenth Convention and
the preparation of a Convention which would guarantee basic humanitarian
protections to civilians who became victims of war. were two of the mat-
ters to be considered by this conference. The conference was prevented
S3from taking place because of the outbreak of world War II,
In light of the experiences and suffering of the millions of war
vie tins of \fyr)<i War TI the advancements made *n warfare such as the
atomic ^ofto , and the increased capability of naval and aerial warfare,
and the widespread involvement of civilian population, the need was ur-
gent, by the time hostilities had ended to revise the laws of war, especi
ally those concerned with war victims. Prior to the cessation of hostiH
ties, the International Committee of the Red Cross undertook the task of
reviewing and revising the Tenth Convention and other Conventions relat-
ing to the laws of war. This Consult tee Incorporated within its proposed
draft, provisions orotecting fundamental rights of war victims, whether
civilian or military, 1n time of war or internal disturbance (civil war).
The Committee produced four draft Conventions which were submitted to,
end »?prov*id with certain amendments by, the Seventh International Red
Cross Conference, which met in Stockholm In 19^8, These drafts formed
the working documents of a conference convened by the Swiss Government
in 19**9, for the Establishment of International Convention for the pro-
co
taction of V4ar Victims (Geneva Conference of 19**9). The importance of
the working documents was not only the thorough research which had gone
Into their preparation but the underlying emphasis that nations had
17

a duty to establish Conventions and other procedures which Mould protect
basic- fundamental human rights of individuals, in time of war
,
The Geneva Conference of 19**9 adopted four Conventions which sub-
sequently have been acceded to or ratified by an overwhelming majority
60
of nations. The four Conventions are: Geneva Convention for the Ameli-
oration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the
Field, of August 12- 19^9 (land Convention): Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of bounded Sick, and Shipwrecked Members
of Armed Forces at Sea, of .August 12, 19^9 (Sea Convention): Geneva Con-
vention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 19^9
(P.O.W. Convention); and Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
61
Civilian Persons in Time of *lar of August 12, 19^9 (Civilian Convention).
The Land, Sea, and P.0.V Conventions tare thorough revisions of earlier
62
treaties. The Civilian Convention is new and developed as a result of
the bitter experience end treatment of millions of civilians in vtorld War
II. There are many similarities between the four Conventions, as the
primary reason for each of these Conventions is the same — protection
of basic, fundamental rights of war victims.
The Sea Convention has developed considerably from the "Additional
Articles of 1869" to the 2H articles of the Tenth Convention and to the
63 articles of the present Convention -- one less than the Land Conven-
tion, which is the traditional Geneva Convention. For the first time
nearly all the provisions of the Land Convention have their counterpart
in the Sea Convention and the order is the same. Thus, at last there
is a true Sea Convention The Sea Convention is not perfect — gaps and
imperfections do exist — but as lone as there is war, there will always

be gaps and imperfections, However, in this troubled world in which we
live, the four Geneva Conventions are important and useful tools which
can be employed to protect basic humanitarian values.
19

1n • CLAIMS. CONC EftNIHG THE SEA CONVENTION
A. SIMILARITIES BETWEEN THE FOUS GENEVA CONVENTIONS
The multl lateral lawmaking Geneva Conventions of 19^9 are humanitarian
in purpose and antiwar in philosophical predilection. The total number
a' articles in the Conventions is over ^00- Tine articles vary from set-
ting forth principles of g?«tt4 width to detailed prescriptions regulating
tb* movement of prisoners of Mir and internees, to the issuance of soap
and tobacco A minimum humanitarian standard of conduct regarding the
treatment of civilians and members of the armed forces who have become
victim? of war is set forth in the Conventions,
The Conventions are complimentary to each other. Their purpose is
clear. They are designed to ensure to those persons of the armed forces
placed hors de combat and to enemy or alien civilians in belligerent
countries %nd to civilians in occupied territories, humane treatment with-
out adverse distinction ba^ed on $ex„ race, religion, nationality or poli-
tical belief. 63
The Geneva Conventions were forged in the &low of the harsh experi-
ences of World vter H **& substantially exhaust the modern law relating
to war victims. As the Hmn Conference of 19**9 lackedtthe power to
revise any of the HfeQM Conventions other than the Tenth, it was impos-
sible to weld Into one composite convention four separate draft conven-
tions each of which had a different ancestry. However, 1t is recognized
that the four Geneva Conventions belong to a homogeneoues group, and the
most striking evidence of this 1s the similarity of the Conventions and
ft
the nu?>*>er of common artlclos. Tcr the most part the common articles
are expressed in identical language, except for slight adaptations

necessary for the particular convention 1n which It Is found
1 . Res pec t for the Conventions
Article 1 of each of the Conventions provides that, "The contracting
parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Con-
vention In all circumstances." This preliminary article does not overlap
with the effects of ratification of the Conventions. Instead it emphasizes
that the failure of a belligerent to abide by the provisions of a Conven-
tion, to which it is a signatory, does not relieve other belligerents,
who are also signatories, from the obligations set forth in the Conven-
tion. Accordingly, if a nation fails to abide by the terms of the Con-
vention, other signatories, whether neutral, ally, or enemy have a duty
65
to ensure that the lapsing nation honor the terms of the Convention.
The parties also undertake to respect and ensure respect for the Conven-
tions in those conflicts in which one or more of the participants are not
parties to the Conventions. In the latter circumstance the Conventions
are binding only as to those parties who are signatories. However, it
has been suggested that the principles of the Geneva Convention require,
at the very least, that a contracting power involved in a conflict with
a non-contracting power initially act in accordance with the provisions
of the Conventions, whose conduct may lead to the result that the non-
contracting power may do likewise. Other writers go one step further
and state that the principles of the Geneva Conventions are binding on
all parties, regardless of the fact they may or may not be a signatory.
They contend that because of the overwhelming number of countries which
2\

have signed the Conventions, the principles set forth in the Conventions
have become a part of the customary international law and thus binding
on all natfons
.
^ *pp 1 i cation of the Conventions
The provisions concerning the situations to which the Conventions
apply ware drafted in very broei torts. The Conventions provide that
they v*U apply in, "AH cases of declared war or of any other armed
conflict which Miy rrise between two or more of the High Contracting
parties, even if the state of war is not recognized by one of them. ,r
They even arp\y to partial or total occupation of the territory or ter-
ritoria* *e3 of a State, even if the occupation is not resisted.
The Conventions make a distinction between conflicts of an interna-
tional character end conflicts of an interna! character (civil war and
interna! insurrection) The reasons <*or the distinction was based upon
the traditional international lav* principle that one sovereign State
should not become involved in the domestic affairs of another sovereign
State. Tn recent y&*r* , however , there haf. been a gJMafttt trend in the
field of intern* ti^na* law wMeh recognizes that the, ^Question of the
observance of fundamental human rights hai. ceased to be one of exclusive
70jurisdiction of States." Accordingly, the progressive drafters of the
Convention iecorpor? v>d Mtthftl tr nv-ision which provides that the
signatories *<"jree to protect certain fundamental rights in conflicts of
71
an internal nature G*ten rt>ferr*»i to as a "Convention in Hiniature,"'
i.1

article 3 of each of the Conventions provides that as to conflicts of an
internal nature, individuals who have not taken part in the rebellion or
who have laid down their weapons because of sickness, wounds, or captivity,
shall be treated with humanity. Murder, mutilation, torture, taking of
hostages, outrages upon personal dignity, the passing of sentence and the
carrying out of executions without previous judgement by a regularly con-
stituted court are also prohibited. Aside from these broad humanitarian
concepts, the provisions of the Conventions do not apply to internal con-
flicts unless there is an agreement to the contrary between the government
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and rebel forces.
The limited application of the Conventions to interna? conflicts does
not in any way confer recognition upon the rebels as a State or Government
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by either the legitimate government or outside States J and the rebels
can be tried pursuant to the domestic criminal law if the rebellion should
fail. It is evident that the drafters attempted, by way of the Conven-
tions, to bind rebels in an internal conflict, to protect basic humani -
tarian values, but the actual legal efficacy of binding insurgents not a
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party to the Conventions has been questioned as doubtful. However, it
is submitted that respect of humanitarian principles is not only incorn-
bent on States, but also on any persons actively involved in hostilities.
The problem that most often arises in connection with article 3 is
what constitutes a conflict of an internal character which would bring
into existence the operation of the article. Varying criteria were sug-
gested during the debates on this article, but the drafters were unable
to agree. However, the general consensus seems to have been that the
article would not cover ordinary criminals and bandits employing armed
23

violence against the police forces of a legitimate government. Even
though the Conventions are silent as to what constitutes an internal con-
flict, various authorities have suggested certain criteria which would
be useful as a means of distinguishing a genuine armed conflict from a
mere act of banditry or an unorganized and shortlived insurrection The
criteria are as follows:
1. That the «*arty in re-
volt against the dejure
government possesses an
organ i zed mi 1 i tary force,
an authority responsible
for its acts, acting with-
in e determinate territory
and having the means of
respecting and ensuring
respect for the Convention.
2 That the legal govern-
ment is obliged to have
recourse to the regular
military forces against
insurgents organised as
military and in possession
of a part ofthe national
territory.
3 (a) That the dejure gov-
ernment has recognized the
insurgents as belligerents
|
or (b) that it has claimed for
itself the rights of a bel-
ligerent; or
(c) that it has accorded
the insurgents recognition
as belligerents for the pur-
pose only of the. . .Convention;
or (d) that the dispute has
been admitted to the agenda
of the Security Council or
the General Assembly of the
United Nations as being a
threat to international
peace or an act of aggression.
**. (a) That the insurgents
have an organization purporting
2k

to have the characteristics
of a State; and
(b) that the insurgent
civil authority exercise
de facto authority over
persons within a determinate
territory; and
(c) that the armed forces
act under the direction of
the organized civil authority
and are prepared to observe
the laws of war, and
(d) that the insurgent
civil authority agrees to
be bound by the provisions
of the Conventions.^o
The incorporation of the humanitarian principles of article 3 in the
Conventions constitutes a giant step forward in the evolution of the
international law of war. It is unfortunate that the Conventions as a
whole are not automatic* J ly applicable in conflicts of an internal nature,
however, article 3 does establish a minimum standard which must be applied
in such conflicts. Article 3» Hke the rest of the articles of the Con-
ventions, is concerned primarily with the individuals and the physical
and moral treatment which they as human beings are entitled. It does not
affect the legal or political treatment which may occur as a result of
77
thei r behavi or
.
3. Renunciation of Conventions by Protected Persons
Persons protected by the Conventions, "May in no circumstances re-
nounce in part or in entirety the rights secured to them by the. . .Conven-
-7 a
tion..." This provision was included to ensure to protected persons,
in all cases, the protection of the Conventions until repatriated by
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preventing a Detaining Power from exercising any pressure on war victims
so as to induce them to renounce their rights under any of the Conventions,
The drafters of the Conventions recognised that an absolute prohi-
bition against renunciation might entail harsh consequences for some
persons. The absolute prohibition against renunciation was included to
safeguard the interests of the majority, exceptions were specifically
excluded as it was felt they would at once open a dangerous breach in
the structure of the Conventions as it would be extremely difficult if
not impossible to prove the existence of duress or pressure in any given
fact situation. It was also felt that in time of war protected persons
in enemy hands are not in possession of a sufficiently independent and
objective state of mind to realize fully the implications of a renuncia-
79
tion of their riahts. /?
k
. Role of the Protecting Powers in Enforcing the Conventions
One of the most important provisions contained in each of the Con-
ventions is that which refers to the role of Protecting Powers. Each
Convention provides that it, "Shall be applied with the cooperation and
under the scrutiny of the Protecting Powers whose duty it is to safeguard
the interests of the parties to the conflict," This is a command ad-
dressed to the parties to a conflict to accept the cooperation of a Pro-
tecting Power; if necessary the parties must demand the cooperati on and
aid of a State to act as Protecting Power. A Protecting Power is a
sovereign State which acts in a utilitarian and legal nature and is the
chief instrument for the effective operation of the Conventions as its main
26

function is to assure protection of war victims by proper application
a*
of the Conventions.
Belligerents are required to facilitate the proper functioning of
a Protecting Power. Performance of tho neutral States' function as a
Protecting Power is exercised through diplomatic and consular staffs or
through other persons specially appointed. All persons exercising these
functions must he nationals of a neutral State, though not necessarily of
the Protecting Power.
Specific duties of the representatives of a Protecting Power include
hearing complaints by prisoners of war-/ lending good offices in case of
a dispute over the application of the Conventions 1 provisions; transmit-
ting prisoner of war information;" aiding correspondence pertaining to
prisoners of war; supervision of the treatment given to the wounded, sick,
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and shipwrecked? supervision of the rules regarding burial j control
and search of hospital ships;' supervision of the condition and treat-
ment of religious, medical and hospital personnel in enemy hands and of
the landing of such personnel; and supervision of ships chartered for
M
the conveyance of medical equipment.* v
The Protecting Power has the obligation to remain neutral. It must
never exceed or misuse its powers and must observe the requirements of
security of the State wherein it functions. A belligerent may restrict
temporarily the functions of a Protecting 9&*<w when such measures are
necessitated by imperative mi li tary necessities. The activities may be
restricted only as an exceptional, temporary ana* partial measure. Re-
strictions may not be total, but can apply only to those activities of the




As has been previously discussed, supervision and the proper imple-
menting of the Conventions depends mainly on action taken by the Protect-
ing Power. During World War XI many war victims had no Power entitled
to defend their interests. In order to prevent this situation from aris-
ing in the future, there was incorporated within each of the Conventions
a provision providing that If for any reason war victims are deprived of
a Protecting Power, the Detaining Power has a duty to request either a
neutral State or an Impartial humanitarian organization to perform the
functions of a Protecting Power. Should such measures prove inadequate,
the Detaining Power then has a duty to request or at least accept the
services of an impartial humanitarian organization which is equipped to
assume and perform the humanitarian tasks usually carried out by a Pro-
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testing Power, but not, of course, its other duties. The key here is
that the impartial humanitarian organization wi 11 be performing the hu-
manitarian tasks normally performed by a Protecting Power, but will not
be undertaking the other functions performed by a Protecting Power. The
humanitarian organization undertakes those activities which bring direct-
ly and Immediately to the persons protected by the Conventions, the care
which their condition demands. •* Thus, such an organization does not
act, as If it were an agent, but rather as a voluntary helper. This Is
of great importance to organizations such as the International Committee
of the Red Cross as it safeguards the Independence of the organization.
Many organizations may be equipped to handle the humanitarian needs of
war victims, but are unable to perform in the diplomatic and political
arena as a State would be able to do.
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5. Reprisals Against Pro tected Persons
Reprisals are a warning to an enemy in the form of retaliatory ac-
tion to serve notice on a belligerent that it should desist from illegal
acts of warfare and to comply with the laws of war. Reprisals are not
employed for the purpose of indicating an abandonment of the laws of war
but on the contrary are resorted to for purposes of enforcing compliance
with the laws of war, In essence, reprisals constitute a form of pay-
ment in kind' and is a last resort to induce compliance with the civilized
concepts of warfare. A reprisal should not be resorted to until all other
efforts have failed. The final decision to resort to a reprisal must be
made on the basis of both law and policy, for a reprisal is en act which
would otherwise be unlawful. Since reprisals are designed to have a deter-
rent effect, they should be made public and announced as being reprisals.
However, the resorting to reprisal action is fraught wf th danger, because
if the reprisal is excessive, it may itself be a war crime.
Reprisals need not conform to those complained of by the injured
party, but should not be excessive or exceed the degree of violence com-
96
mitted by the offending bel Jigerent. It is submitted that when a State
is confronted with an enemy which holds little respect for human rights
and dignity and where the enemy has engaged in a long course of abuse and
usurpation of rights, it is doubtful whether the carrying out of a reprisal
would be of any value. Experience in past wars has shown that reprisals
instead of compelling adherance to the law of war have often formed the
pretext for their wholesale abandonment. Accordingly, only in exceedingly
97grave cases should there be a resort to reprisals.
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Since reprisals are carried out because the guilty parties among the
enemy cannot be apprehended, tried, or punished, reprisals are usually
taken against persons (reprisals also can be taken against property) who
are themselves guilty of no offense. However, the Geneva Conventions
have reduced significantly the individuals against whom reprisals may
be legally directed. Pursuant to these Conventions, the categorf es of
persons immune from reprisals include; the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked;
the personnel of medical units, establishments, and hospital ships;
chaplains; prisoners of war; enemy belligerents found in a belligerent's
own territory; and inhabitants of areas occupied by an enemy belligerent.
For all practical purposes the effect of the Conventions is that all per-
sons who find themselves under the control orjurisdiction of an enemy
belligerent are immune as targets of reprisal. Thus, persons whose use-
fulness as a basis of enemy power is precluded, or has been eliminated,
cease to be legitimate objects of violence. Practically the only indi-
viduals who may still be the lawful subjects of reprisals are those on
the high seas and in the enemy's own territory.
A protected person s immunity from reprisal is very broad, as all
types of reprisals are forbidden; however, moderate the deprivations in-
volved. The Conventions also include within the prohibition reprisals
in kind even when the prior illegal enemy act consisted of maltreatment
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or killing of protected persons.
Reprisals are distinguished from retortion, retortion is retaliation
for actions which may be objectionable, but never the less legally permis-
sible. An example of what is not retaliation or a reprisat is set forth
in the following illustration: Britain, during World war II in order to
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prevent supplies from reaching Germany blockaded practically the entire
too
coast of Europe and also renewed the navicerting system of World War
I. As a result of the British action, Germany declared the area around
the British isles a war zone and announced her intention of sinking all
ships, ene&y , neutral, merchant or war which ventured into the areas.
The British measures establishing the blockade and contraband control,
were enforced in a way that did not violate the laws of humanity
,
(some
of the international laws pertaining to interfering with neutrals may
have keen violated) however, the German submarine and mine warfare, al-
leged to be reprisal for the British blockade, caused considerable loss
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of life and property to both belligerent and neutral shipping. The
German action against Britain was neither a retortion as the manner in
which it was carried out was clearly illegal nor could the German action
property be considered a reprisal as it was not carried out for the pur-
pose of inducing Britain to abide by the laws of war.
6 . Breaches of the Conventions; Sanctions
It is not enough for a State to enact appropriate legislations or
ratify Conventions unless the provisions of the legislation and Conven-
tions can be effectively applied and respected. Infringements must be
clearly recognized and their perpetrators duly punished; furthermore;
any breaches must be discontinued. In time of war, legal principles;
especially today, when warfare can be particularly ruthless; are liable
to be entirely disregarded. Vfliat may be termed humanitarian law is
weakened by the fact it is part and parcel of the laws and customs of
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warfare However, there is one factor which tends to make up for this
deficiency and which is inherent in so called humanitarian law and that
is that, 'The interests involved are not of an economic order, but of
the highest moral significance - they concern the protection of the life
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and dignity of human beings.-'
The Geneva Conventions contain provisions pertaining to two types
of breaches; grave and those which are not grave. Even though the ex-
pression grave breaches is not exactly defined, each Convention does con-
tain a list of acts which are regarded as grave breaches. The pro-
visions relating to grave breaches are particularly impressive as they
set forth a list of serious breaches which strike at the very roots of
humanity. The following matters are contained In each of the Conventions
as constituting a grave breach: willful killing; torture or inhuman
treatment, including biological experiments? and willfully causing suffer-
ing or injury. In addition the Land, Sea, and Civilian Conventions pro-
vide that extensive destruction and appropriation of property not justi-
fied by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly,
constitutes a grave offense. The P,0.W. and Civilian Conventions further
provide that the taking of hostages, compelling of protected persons
to serve in the armed forces of a hostile power, and the denying of pro-
tected persons a fair and regular trial constitutes grave breaches. De-
portation, transfer, and unlawful confinement of protected persons are
items incorporated within the Civilian Convention constituting a grave
breach which is not present in the other Conventions,
The Conventions provide that signatories will, if necessary enact
legislation to provide effective penal sanctions for persons committing or
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ordering the commission of a grave breach. However, as to breaches other
than grave, the Conventions do not require signatories to enact legis-
lation, but to take only those measures necessary to ensure their sup-
JO**
pression, such measures may be administrative or disciplinary.
The war crimes trials have established that crimes against interna-
tional law are committed by men, not by abstract entities an6 that punish-
ing individuals is an effective method for enforcing the provisions of
international law. If the war crimes trials are precedent, it is very
clear that any person* at any level of the civilian or military hierarchy
can be tried for an offense committed against protected persons. Accord-
ingly, this principle was carried over into the Conventions, as they are
directed not only to States, but also individuals. Furthermore, the
Conventions provide that every party has a duty to search for, "Persons
alleged to have committed or to have ordered to be commi tted. . .grave
105breaches," and if such a person is apprehended, the State in whose
territory the apprehension is made may try the offender in its own courts
The Conventions do not attempt to provide for the trial of grave breaches
by any international tribunal, but contemplate only trial and sentence by
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the courts of parties. However, it is submitted that since such
offenses are of such international notoriety and are established by
international Conventions and custom, they could also be brought before
an international tribunal.
If the State in whose territory the apprehension of a person accused
of a grave breach is made, desires not to prosecute.. "It may -..in accor-
dance with the provisions of its own legislation, hand such persons over
3J

for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided such...
107
party has made out a prima facie case-" The reason for including
such a provision in the Conventions was to deprive war criminals of a
sanctuary in a neutral State; in yorld War I and earlier conflicts it was
not unusual for accused war criminals to seek and receive asylum in a
neutral State. This provision to hand over an accused, if the Detain-
ing Party does not try him, is so worded as to be virtually non-existent.
Although the intention of the drafters may have been to create an obli-
gation upon States to extradite war criminals, the Conventions as worded
109do not achieve this result. The obligation of the Detaining Power is
to hand over, "In accordance with the provisions of its own legislation. 11
However, the Conventions contain no requirements that signatories enact
extradition legislation There is the further difficulty that certain
of the listed grave breaches (deportation or transfer of protected persons)
might, if a broad meaning is given to the term, be considered as political
1 10
offenses which are not generally accepted as being extradictable.
The Conventions in their treatment of grave breaches have in a sense
established an international penal code by setting forth certain types
of conduct whifeh constitute international crimes. In a way, taking into
consideration the universality of the Conventions, the law pertaining to
1 1
1
grave breaches is analogous to the law of piracy as the Conventions
impose on all parties a duty to apprehend persons regardless of their




7 * Denunciation and Repudiation of the Conventions by Signatories
Parties to the Conventions are free to withdraw at any time. How-
ever, if the party withdrawing is involved in a conflict, the denuncia-
tion will not take effect until peace has been concluded and protected
1 12
persons have been released and repatriated
Minor violations by a belligerent are not a sufficient cause to
conclude that a repudiation of one or more of the Conventions has taken
place. It is submitted { that where the violation by a belligerent,
though of only a part of a Convention, destroys he fundamental objectives
he Conventions were designed to achieve, a State may be entitled to con-
sider that the Conventions have been repudiated in their entirety. For
example, if a belligerent places prisoners of war in theffront lines of
its forces in order to forestall an advance or forces them to en^s^e in
combat,, the opposing State would undoubtedly be justified in considering
this, ipso facto, a total repudiation of the Conventions.
lit WWWill nium , ii ill ii
In the event an opposing belligerent utterly refuses to abide by the
provisions of the Conventions, a State may declare itself absolved of its
obligations under the Conventions aa it pertains to that belligerent.
If a State does denunciate or repudiate the Conventions, it is still
bound by the generally accepted humanitarian principles which have achieved
the dignity of International law. The Conventions insofar as they express
customary International lav* would continue to bind all parties.
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3. 01 ssemi nation of the Conventions
States wnen they become parties to the Conventions undertake to re-
spect and ensure respect for the Conventions in all circumstances. If
the Conventions are to be honored and properly applied a thorough know-
ledge of their provisions is essential. One of the worst enemies of the
1 13Conventions is ignorance. Each of the Conventions requires the sig-
natories to include instruction as to their contents in all programs of
military instruction and, if possible, in civilian programs of instruc-
tion. It is difficult to overstate the importance of this provision.
Failure of nations to comply with this provision has resulted in some
unfortunate incidents involving members of national contingents forming
1 1*4
part of the United Nations Peacekeeping Forces in the Congo; and of
Allied and Communist Forces in Vietnam.
The Conventions have been in force as to the United States since
February of 1956} yet, it wasn't until fairly recently, through news
reports from Vietnam that the majority of the American general public
even became vaguely aware of the existence and of some of the main
provisions of these important international agreements. Even today, de-
tailed knowledge of the provisions of the Conventions is limited to a
relatively small group of international lawyers, law professors, and
1 15
members of the International Committee of the Red Cross. When one
considers the substantive and procedural requirements set forth in the
Conventions) the substantial part of the modern law of war represented
by these Conventions) end the significance of the provisions pertaining





If the Conventions are to succeed in preventing unnecessary suffer-
ing during hostilities, their provisions must be widely disseminated.
Widespread instruction and distribution of the Conventions will not only
facilitate their application in times of war, but will also spread the
principles of humanity and may help to defelop a spirit of peace among
nations.
B. DUTIES AND OBLIGATIONS OWED TO PROTECTED PERSONS UNDER THE SEA
CONVENTION
The purpose of naval warfare is the same as land warfare, the over-
powering of the enemy, However, as in land warfare, so in naval warfare
not every practice capable of injuring enemy personnel in offense or de-
fense is lawful. In regard to killing and wounding of enemy personnel in
naval warfare, customary international law provides that only those per-
sons may be killed or wounded who actively participate in hostilities or
who resist capture. Professor Mallison, Professor of Law at George Wash-
ington University, has written thats
A central objective of the
laws of war is to reduce
the destructiveness invol-
ved in military operations
by providi ng. . .a minimum
standard of protection to
individuals. . .Indi vidua Is
...so protected comprise
non-combatants and combat-
dncs • • *
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Accordi tvjly , personnel disabled because of sickness or wounds and those
1 1
:
who surrender are to be protected.
While the customary international law was priraari ly concerned with
members of the armed forces,, the Geneva Conventions have extended protec-
tion to certain categories of civilians. The Sea Convention specifically
applies to $11 members of an armed force and civilians considered assimi-
lated 1ntc the armed forces. Civilians protected by the Convention are
those individuals who are members of a crew or plane or ship? members
of the merchant marine? journalist and war correspondents; contractors;
members of service organizations such as the U.S.C. or 8ed Cross, which
are concerned 4th the health and welfare of members of the armed forces;
and members of volunteer militias, corps, or organized resistance move-
ments. In order for mentors of a volunteer militia* corps,, or resistance
movement to come within the provisions of the Convention, the following
criteria must be met:
(a) that of being commanded
by a person responsible
for his ^ubordi nates;
(b) that of having a fixed
distinctive sigh recog-
nizable at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms
openly; and
(d) that of conducting their
operations in accordance
Ath the laws and customs
of war. "?
It is interesting to note that persons protected by the Sea Conven-
tion are substantially the same persons entitled to protection under
the P.O.W. Convention. The reason enumeration of protected persons
was set forth in both Conventions was that the drafters envisioned the
possibility that a State might be a party to one Convention and not the
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other. ' The practical importance of the similarity of provisiions in
the two Conventions is that a wounded, sick, or shipwrecked person is to
be cared for and protected; treatment, care and protection is emphasized
rather than status.
The categories of persons protected by the Sea Convention are broad,
it is also apparent from a study of the legislative history that many of
the framers felt that interpretation of the Convention should be in a
way which would require a belligerent to respect all wounded or ship-
wrecked persons, even if such individuals do not belong to any of the cate-
gories specifically specified as entitled to protection. In fact, one
commentator writes that:
In virtue of a humanitarian
principle universally recog-
nized in international law,
of which the Geneva Conven-
tions are merely the practical
expression, any wounded, sick
or shipwrecked person whatever-
even a franc -tireur or a cri-
minal -is entitled to respect
and humane treatment and the
care which his condition re-
quires .. .(The Convention) can-
not... in any way entitle a
belligerent to refrain from
respecting a wounded or ship-
wrecked person or to deny
him the requisite treatment,
even where he does not be-
long to any of the categories
(specifically specified in
the Convention), Any wounded
person, whoever he may be,
must be treated by the enemy
in accordance with... the ..
Convention. *22
A belligerent which is forced to abandon its wounded must, so far as




and supplies to assist in their care. In caring for the wounded and
sick of both the enemy and a belligerent's own forces priority of medical
treatment can be justified only on the grounds of medical urgency. Dis-
crimination in treatment based upon sex, race, religion, nationality,
political opinion or any other similar criteria is specifically prohibited,
A medical facility which is crowded by an influx of wounded, both friendly
and enemy, must give attention to those persons for whom delay might be
fatal, afterwards proceeding to those patients whose condition was not
such as to necessitate immediate attention.
None of the Geneva Conventions define the terms '•wounded" and "sick."
However, it is generally agreed that these terms apply to those persons
who have fallen by reason of a wound or sickness of any type, or who have
ceased to fight and have laid down their weapons because of what they them-
selves think about their health. It is the laying down of weapons which
constitutes the claim to protection. The combatant who seeks to kill
may be killed, but the abandonment of combat should put an end to the
fighting. There may be times when the obligation to cease hostilities can-
not be respected. For example, an amphibious landing, it is not always
possible to distinguish between an attacker trying to reach land and a
soldier or sailor in danger of drowning. Similarly in the case of under-
water demolition personnel it may not always be evident when they are in
peril and need of assistance. However, in such instances, persons in
distress who renounce active combat must be respected and rescued once
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their perilous position becomes known.'
The term "shipwrecked >•' as employed by the Convention is broadly
construed.. The Convention is clear that the term means, "Shipwrecked
**0

1 26from any cause and includes forced landings at sea by or from aircraft." '
The term includes air crewmen who parachute into sea, s well as person-
nel aboard planes and vessels which have made forced landings, as well
as persons who are in need of assistance and care, who are refraining
from hostile acts and who are in peril as a result of loss or damage to
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the craft on which they were aboard. It is evident from the legisla-
tive history that the primary concern of the drafters was that the term
"shipwrecked: be given a very broad interpretation so as to protect in-
dividuals at sea who were in need of assistance and help.
The basic concern of the Maritime Convention is personnel at sea.
The Convention makes it clear that in a conflict between land and naval
forces, it applies to forces at sea, once armed forces are put ashore they
128become subject to the Land Convention. However, regardless of which
Convention is applicable to a given fact situation, it is abundantly
clear that the underlying humanitarian principles of the Geneva Conven-
tions are always applicable and that individuals who become hors de combat
are to be respected and protected.
1 . Status of the Sick, Wounded or Shipwrecked in Enemy Hands
"The wounded, sick, and shipwrecked., .who fall into enemy hands shall
129be prisoners of war..." This provision defines the status of a wounded,
sick or shipwrecked person who has come within the control and custody of
the enemy. Such a person is at one and the same time a wounded, sick,
shipwrecked person who is entitled to medical care and attention as i f
he were not an enemy, and a combatant who is a prisoner of war. A wounded
*H

sick or shipwrecked person who falls into the hands of the enemy which
is a party to both the Sea and P O.W. Conventions will enjoy protection
under both Conventions. The Sea Convention takes precedence over the
P.O.W. Convention where the two overlap. The point regarding precedence
is more academic than practical, since the protection accorded fay the
P.O.W. Convention is equivalent to that accorded by the Sea Convention.
It is emphasized that the Sea Convention relates primarily to wounded,
sick, and shipwrecked persons, in a temporary situation, where the prin-
cipal concern is to rescue and tend the victims. The P. O.W. Convention
applies fully in the following state, that of captivity on land when the
Detaining Power must make the necessary arrangements for a prolonged de-
tention.
Enemy wounded, sick or shipwrecked personnel may be held aboard a
warship only as a temporary measure pending transfer to land. The Mari-
time Convention does not provide guidance of a specific character for the
treatment of prisoners of war while detained on board a warship. However,
the Convention does provide that, 'The provisions of international law
concerning prisoners of war shall apply." Accordingly, it is submit-
ted that the general obligations laid down for the protecti on of prisoners
132
of war in the P. O.W. Convention must be complied with at least to the
degree that those obligations are relevant to the circumstances pertain-
ing to internment on blard belligerent warships. It is recognized that
these provisions are of a very general character and consequently leave
unanswered many questions that will arise In the course of operations at
sea. Nevertheless, a belligerent must refrain from imposing unnecessary




subjecting such persons to unnecessary danger.
There are several courses of action available to a belligerent hold-
ing on board its warship personnel of the opposing party. They are:
transfer such persons to the territory of the Detaining State and intern
them in a prisoner of war camp} land such persons in a neutral territory;
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or return such individuals to their home State.
The landing of sick, wounded, or shipwrecked persons in a neutral
country is subject to the consent of the authorities in the neutral State.
A neutral State, even a signatory to the Geneva Conventions is not obliged
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to agree, for in certain instances the accommodation of sick and wounded
persons could place a heavy burdon on the neutral. If a foreign warship
does land enemy personnel at a nwtral port, the neutral must intern such
personnel so as to prevent their return to their country and there again
take part in operation of war. A neutral State may, with the consent of
the belligerents, return interned individuals to their State.
A neutral State interning belligerent personnel has a duty to apply
as a minimum standard the provisions of the Sea and P.O.W. Conventions in
1 16
its dealings with interned persons. The power upon whom the interned
personnel are dependent is responsible to the neutral for the cost of
internment.
The status of sick, wounded, and shipwrecked individuals aboard
enemy hospital ship are not prisoners of war. It is unimportant how an
individual got aboard a hospital ship. A hospital ship, even though it
may be a commissioned ship of a State's naval forces, is not a warship,
it is a charitable vessel considered non-hostile and may not commit an
act of war. It is an ac* of war to capture enemy personnel or hold them
i»3

as prisoners of war. However, this is in no way prevents special security
measures on hospital ships to protect the ship and crew from any person
j 37
which might cause a disturbance or try to take over the ship. It is
the fact of being landed in enemy territory or being taken aboard a war-
ship, and thus being taken over by enemy military authorities that con-
stitutes capture.
If a man-of-war transfers enemy wounded, sick or shipwrecked person-
nel to a hospital ship of its own nationality, their prisoner of war status
wi 1 1 be temporarily suspended; their fate will be determined by the country
in which they are landed or by the nationality of a warship which takes
them aboard. In the same way a merchant ship cannot confer the status of
prisoner of war upon the sick, wounded or shipwrecked of a belligerent,
which it may have rescued or picked up for it is not a warship even though
1 38
it may be armed for purposes of self defense.
2. Battle Casualties; A Duty to Search For
The basic underlying premise of the S«*a Convention (that persons hors
de combat must be respected and protected) obviously implies that such
persons must be rescued from peril. However, to leave no doubt, the drafters
incorporated within the Convention a provision which provides that, "After
each engagement, parties to the conflict shall without delay. . .search for
...the wounded and sick, to project them against pillage and ill treat-
ment, to ensure their adequate care, and to search for the dead and pre-
139
vent their being despoiled." The reason for specifically including
and emphasizing such an important provision is that diligent search and
Uk

swift treatment will save lives. The obligation to act is strict, it
must be done without delay after every engagement, air or naval, The
measures which may be emplo/ed to collect the wounded, sick, and ship-
wrecked are many and varied even if the assistance of civilian ships and
rescue craft must be requested. A warship lacking the facilities to
collect and care for the victims of an engagement must alert other ships
in the area or provide the victims with the means to await rescue, such
as providing life boats, food, water, compass and charts. It is submit-
ted that rescue 2ones should be set up after a naval engagement. Such
zones would permit the speedy rescue of persons hors de combat , by pro-
viding an area in which vessels and persons of all nationalities could
engage in rescue operations without fear of attack. There is no doubt
that the establishment of rescue zones would be in keeping with the hu-
manitarian principles set forth in the Sea Convention.
Even though the obligations to engage in rescue operations is strict,
a belligerent may be justified in not engaging in rescue operations in a
particular fact situation because military necessity or materia! conditions
make such an operation impossible or, extremely dangerous. However, under
no circumstances may a belligerent refuse quarter or kill survivors,
"Survivors struggling in the water or seeking safety on life rafts or in
life boats are no longer effective instruments of military power ., .(T)hey
1^1
are not lav.'ful objects of attack." Furthermore,
If a . .commander can without
danger to his (ship) save or
succor survivors, he is.,
under a duty to do so. If
however, b/ doing so he would
endanger his (ship) he cannot
be held responsible if he does
kS

not save any. . .survivors
since it is recognized
that the safety of his
own (ship and crew) must
be his primary considera-
tion. It is clearly re-
cognized, on the other
hand, that the ki 1 ling
of defenseless survivors
of a torpedoed ship is
a war crime. "2
The duty to render assistance after an engagement is of particular
importance and significance when merchant ships are involved. The Civil-
ian's Convention specifically provides that as far as military necessity
allows, "Each party to the conflict shall facilitate the steps taken to
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search for the. . .shipwrecked..." It would also appear that the Con-
vention for the Unification of Certain Rules of Law with Respect to As-
sistance and Salvage at Sea would be applicable. It provides that, "Every
master is bound, so far as he can do so without serious danger to his
vessel, her crew, and passengers, to render assistance to everybody, even
though an enemy, found at sea in danger of being lost." It is also
noted that in the event of an engagement between a man-of-war and a mer-
chant vessel, the crew and passengers of a merchant ship are also protected
by Part IV of the Treaty for the Limitation and Reduction of Naval Armament,
(London Naval Treaty) which provides in part that:
Except in the case of persis-
tent refusal to stop on being
duly sammoned, or of active
resistance to visit or search,
a warship. . .may not sink or
render incapable of navigation
a merchant vessel without hav-
ing first placed passengers,
crew and ship's papers in a
place of safety. For this
purpose the ship's boats are
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not regarded as a place of
safety unless the safety of
the passengers and crew is
assured, in the existing
sea and weather conditions,
by the proximity of land,
or the presence of another
vessel which is in a posi-
tion to take them on board. '^5
Closely related to the killing of survivors is the refusal to give
quarter. It is unlawful for a combatant to continue an attack when there
has been a clear indication of surrender. Once the enemy has indicated
surrender quarter must be given and the objective seized without further
firing. Some writers contend that it would be permissible to refuse quarter
in the case of reprisal. However, it is the writer's opinion that the
helpless survivors of a vessel or military objective are not proper objects
of reprisals especially in view of the prohibitions of the Geneva Con-
ventions of reprisals against protected persons. Once a person surren-
ders h« becomes a protected person to be respected and cared for.
3. Treatment of the Deceased t Examination and Proper Burial
The parties to a conflict are required after each engagement to search
1^7
not only for the living, but also the deceased. The deceased must be
protected from pillage and examined to confirm death and to establish iden-
tity. If no identification tags or papers are on the body, resort must
be made to other methods of identification, such as fingerprints, pictures,
or dental examinations. This information must then be forwarded to the
adverse party. Belligerents must prepare and forward to each other, through
the National Prisoners Information Bureau, certificates of death and
<*7

authenticated lists of the dead, identity discs or cards found on the body.
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wills and other important documents belonging to the deceased.
As far as circumstances permit burial at sea must be carried out in-
dividually. The intention of this provision was not to preclude the,
"Committal of several bodies at the same time*. .but to ensure that each
body is committed separately in a weighted. . .bag." In the event enemy
dead are transferred to land, article 17 of the Land Convention would then
be applicable and would take precedence over the Sea Convention.
k . Prisoners of War: Dependent State Must Be Notified of Detention
As has been previously discussed enemy persons picked up at sea will
become prisoners of war. Belligerents are required to forward as soon
as possible to the Dependent State, information regarding each person
falling into their hands. Generally, a warship has good reason to limit
the use of its communication facilities, and information pertaining to
the sick, wounded, and shipwrecked will not be transmitted until the
ship arrives at port. The practice is that the ship will land the indi-
viduals concerned at which time the Land and P.O.W. Conventions will take
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precedence over the Sea Convention. However, in order to leave no
gaps, provisions were also incorporated within the Sea Convention per-
taining to notification of the Dependent State, even though, the Land
and P.O.W. Conventions would be applicable.
The notification procedures are designed to work in the following
manner. A commanding officer of a vessel which has aboard detained per-
sons must obtain and forward certain information regarding each shipwrecked,
i»3

sick, wounded or dead person to a National Prisoners Information Bureau,
which each belligerent is required to open at the commencement of hostili-
ties. The information which the bureau receives from its armed forces
is then forwarded to both the Protecting Power and Central Prisoners of
152
War Agency. It is generally the job of the Protecting Power to pro-
vide the Power of Origin of the persons concerned with the information
received from the National Information Bureau.
The functions of the Central Prisoners of War Agency are set forth
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in the P.O.W. Convention. • As it is not within the scope of the pre-
sent paper to consider in detail the nature and operation of that agency,
it will be discussed only in general terms. One of the primary functions
of the Central Prisoners of War Agency is to keep detained person s fami-
lies informed and to form a permanent link between them and their captured
relatives. The agency is essentially concerned with human relations, where-
as the functions of the Protecting Power are mainly administrative. The
agency conducts inquiries of i tw own, arranges for exchanging of corres-
154pondence and the forwarding of personal property.
The information concerning detained persons required to be forwarded
by each belligerent as expeditiously as possible consists of the following:
(1) designation of the power on which the detained person depends; (2)
serial number; (3) full name; (4) date of birth; (5) any other provision
shown on the detained persons identity card or disc; (6) date and place
of capture or death; and (7) any particulars concerning wounds, illness,
1 55
or cause of death. It is interesting to note that all of the required
information, under normal circumstances can be obtained without interro-
gation. Items 1 - 5 in the above list can be obtained simply by reading
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the identity card or disc which all military personnel are required to
carry wi th them. The information required by items 5 and 6 can be sup-
plied by the crew of the vessel which rescued or picked up the detained
persons. The reason for limiting the information which a Detaining Power
is required to obtain is to protect prisoners from pressure which a
Detaining Power might be tempted to resort to i n order to obtain infor-
mation of a military character.
It is noted that when interrogating enemy personnel the provisions
of the P.O.W. Convention must be complied with as there is a gap in the
Sea Convention relating to this matter. The Sea Convention discusses in-
formation which must be obtained from enemy personnel, but does not dis-
cuss the prohibitions connected with interrogations. It is recognized
that intelligence is of vital importance to belligerents, accordingly bel-
ligerents are not prohibited from interrogating prisoners regarding mili-
tary matters and matters beyond the scope permitted by the Convention.
The prisoner, however, is not bound to answer questions other than those
which have been set forth previously. A prisoner may not be punished
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for giving false information in response to questions of a military nature.
However, interrogators are prohibited from applying mental or physical
torture of any form for the purpose of securing military information.
The duty incombent upon belligerents to forward informati on applies
not only to military personnel, but also to civilians. As it is the
duty of belligerents to collect and assist not only military personnel,
153
but also civilians who arc the victims of < disaster at sea.
Article 19 of the Sea Convention makes reference to "unidentified
articles" which should be forwarded to the enemy. It has happened, in
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war, that the only parts of a ship or plane, found after a brutal explo-
sion were a few stray objects floating in the sea- By collecting &nd
forwarding such objects the enemy may be able to identify the persons
*h© have disappeared. Sometimes floating debris Is the only proof of the
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total disappearance of an entire crew of a ship or airplane.
5 . Status of Civi lians and Merchant Vcsseis Who Render Human! tarlan Aid
to the Enemy
Previously , it was discussed that belligerents have an obligation
to search for and collect the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked after every
engagement and if the belligerent is unable to collect and care for the
casualties it can make an appeal for assistance. In addition, merchant
vessels, private citizens and relief societies may on their own initia-
tive render aid to the wounded, sick and shipwrecked, without a request
to do so.
In order to encourage merchant vessels and private individuals to
assist in the collecting and rendering aid to the victims of a naval
engagement, the Sea Convention provides that:
Vessels of Any kind respond-
ing (to an appeal for assis-
tance), and those having of
their own accord collects
wounded, sick or shipwrecked
persons, shall enjoy special
protection. . .to carry out
such •§*{ stance. They rr.ay,
In no case, be captured; but
in the absence of any promise
to the contrary, they shall
rtAB in liable.. for any vi o-
tatlons of neutrality they
may have cotwrri ttcd. ™Q
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The quoted pri vision is based cm the fundamental humanitarian principle
that not only roust a wounded, sick or shipwrecked person be respected,
but he must also be collected and cared for without delay. The purpose
of the protection is to improve the lot of war victims. Tending the
wounded, sick, and shipwrecked does not constitute an interference in a
conflict, nor is it a violation of neutrality. A violation of neutrality
is the giving of military assistance such as the transporting of war con-
i& i
traband or the running of a blockade.
A belligerent must permit spontaneous care for war victims by local
civilians where they are able to do so. However, a belligerent may
prosecute its own citizens for concealing or putting an enemy national
162
in the hands of an escape or resistance organization. A belligerent
should under no circumstances encourage civilians to harm or injure enemy
personnel who are hors de combat as the civilian population has an obli-
gation, same as military personnel, to respect the wounded, sick, and
shipwrecked and to abstain from inflicting violence upon protected per-
sons. Breach of this obligation by a civilian constitutes a war crime.
During World War H there were many instances of civilians committing
acts of violence against Allied personnel who were hors de combat . After
the war several civilians were convicted of war crimes because of mal-
163
treatment of enemy personnel who were hors de combat .
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C. IMMUNITY OF HOSPITAL SHIPS
International Jaw recognizes that certain belligerent vessels are
exempt from capture or destruction when innocently enployed. These
include: cartel vessels - vessels designated for and engaged in the
exchange of prisoners of war? hospital ships and medical transports
when properly designated; vessels charged with religious, scientific,
or philanthropic missions; small coastal fishing vessels; and vessels
16**
guaranteed safe conduct by agreement between belligerents. Included
within the classification of hospital ships entitled to immunity are:
all military hospital ships, belligerent private enemy hospital ships,*
and private neutral hospital ships.
The Sea Convention contains several articles pertaining to hospital
ships and small rescue craft. These provisions represent a most impor-
tant part of the Convention and are designed to provide* protection and
respect for hospital ships as well as to prevent abuses of the privileges
which such vessels enjoy, that is, to ensure that military commanders do
not give way to temptations to use empty shipping space for any unautho-
rized purpose.
Military hospital ships are vessels especially equipped for the pur-
pose of assisting, treating and transporting of the wounded, sick, and
shipwrecked. Such vessels are generally commissioned vessels of a State's
navy and are immune from attack and capture. However, hospital ships are
not warships even though they may be part of a nation s navy. According-
ly, hospital ships are not subject to many of the restrictions applicable
to warships; an illustration of this is that hospital ships are free from
many of the restrictions which can be imposed upon belligerent warships
$3

in neutral ports. The framers of the Convention felt that in view of
the humanitarian characteristics of a hospital ship it would have been
167
unjust to submit such ships to the same restrictions as warships.
Another privilege enjoyed by hospital ships not extended to warships is
that, "Any hospital ship in a port which falls into the hands of the
J 68
enemy shall be authorized to leave the said port." Thus a hospital
ship is exempt from capture or seizure in a port just as in the terri-
torial sea or on the high seas* However, it is noted that this freedom
from capture whether in port, territorial sea or high seas does not pro-
hibit inspection or even detention of up to 7 days if the gravity of the
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circumstances so requires*
The second class of hospital ship (belligerent private enemy hospital
ships) consists of those ships equipped wholly or in part ot the expense
of private parties or officially recognized relief societies of one of
the belligerents. For the most part a private hospital ship is subject
to the same conditions and entitled to the same respect and protection
as a military hospital ship provided it has received an "official commis-
170
sion" from its government. This Commission is merely an authorization
putting the ship into service, (should not be confused with the commission-
ing of a war or naval ship), it can be in the form of a separate document
171
or just a notation in the ship's
The third class of hospital ships (private neutral hospital ships)
are also equipped wholly or in part at the expense of private individuals
or officially recognized relief societies. This type of hospital ship
is entitled to the same privileges and immunities astthe other two classes
of hospital ships if placed under the control of a party to the conflict
5<<

and has received permission fronr, its own government. Eventthough a pri-
vate neutral hospital ship consents to control by one of the belligerent's
this in no way prevents the ship from rescuing and treating without regard
to nationality or for that matter any other form of discrimination, those
in need of assistance in accordance with the general humanitarian princi-
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pies set forth in the Geneva Conventions.
The Sea Convention specifically provides that, "Merchant vessels
which have been transformed into hospital ships cannot be put to any
173
other use throughout the duration of hostilities." '* The reasons for
including this provision in the Convention was to prevent a vessel from
being camouflaged as a hospital ship for purposes of escaping from a
blockaded port or crossing a danger zone, and to afford to hospital ships
a position of stability and permanence. It was felt that much confu-
sion could be avoided by prohibiting repeated conversions and it is doubt-
ful whether hasty conversions would be intthe best interest of the wounded,
sick, and shipwrecked. Furthermore, in time of war it would be complete-
ly undesirable to permit a belligerent to prevent imminent capture or
175destruction of a ship by hastily converting it to a hospital ship.
There are two conditions for according immunity to hospital ships.
They ares the belligerents undertake not to use hospital ships for any
military purpose, the sole purpose of the ship will be for the assisting,
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treating, and transporting of wounded, sick and shipwrecked persons;
and the name and characteristics of a hospital ship must be notified to
177
the parties prior to it» being put into service. If a hospital ship
ies these conditions it is entitled to protection and respect at all
times and under all circumstances. The immunity accorded to hospital ships
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also extends to life boats of such ships.
The protection accorded to hospital ships is not lost unless such a
ship engages in hostile acts harmful to the enemy. However, before any
action can be taken against a hospital ship suspected of engaging in il-
legal activity, a warning roust be given providing a reasonable time limit
for the ship to put an end to its unlawful acts after which the vessel
ma/ be captured or even attacked in rare cases. Needless, to say if it
becomes necessary to capture or attack a hospital ship, a belligerent
should do everything it possibly can to ensure the humane treatment of
the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked aboard the vessel, as the protected
17 3
parties could not be held responsible for the unlawful act of the crew.
The Convention does not set forth what constitutes a reasonable time
limit. However, it is submitted that the time period will vary depending
upon the gravity of the violation and other facts and circumstances. It
is to be emphasized that, the immunity of a hospital ship is not jeopar-
dized because the ship contains sophisticated apparatus which is used to
facilitate navigation and communication} or the ship is transporting medi-
cal personnel and equipment over and above normal requirements? or the
crew is armed to rr&intain order and for self defense; or there is the
presence of portable arms and ammunition taken from the wounded, sick,
179
and shipwrecked; or care has been extended to civilians
As the signatories to the Convention have agreed to employ hospital
ships and rescue crsft for only humanitarian purposes, belligerents in
order to assure themselves that this is the case, must be able to take
practical precautions (since a hospital ship can move about freely) to
ensure that such a ship is not engaging in illegal activity. In order to
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ensure that the Immunity of hospital ships is not abused and that the
military Interests of the belligerents are protected, the Convention
provides that belligerents can search hospital ships 5 decline assistance
from themj require such ships to followsa prescribed course of navigations
limit the use of such a ship's means of communication? and can even even
temporarily place aboard a commissioner to ensure compliance with the
Convention and any special instructions given by a belligerent. More-
over, the belligerents may either unilaterally or by agreement place
I
neutral observers on ships to ensure observance of the Convention.
The task of an observer is to, "Verify the strict observation of the pro-
visions (of)., .the Convention. 1 ' The reports made by an observer will
make it possible to prove any breach which may have been committed or to
clear the vessel of unfounded charges and thus prevent the possibility of
the enemy resorting to reprisals.
It appears that the Convention has settled the disputed question,
which arose during World War II, as to the size of hospital ships, There
were no size limitations set forth in previous Conventions and the dis-
pute arose when Germany commissioned a large number of small craft for the
purpose of rescuing downed airmen. The British announced that they would
refuse to recognize hospital ships of less than 3>Q00 tons. The reason
for the British position was that they were reluctant to give recognition
- and consequent immunity to large numbers of small craft which might be
used by the enemy for espionage and intelligence work, in the vicinity
of coastal defenses at a time of what was believed to be an imminent in-
vasion. The United States did not adopt such a position nor did the British
strictly enforce the 3*000 ton limitation. The Sea Convention sets
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forth no minimum standards as to size of hospital ships? it provides that
it, "Shall apply to hospital ships of any tonnage and to their life boats
...(T)o ensure maximum comfort and security, the Parties (should) endeavour
133
to uti lize.. .hospi tal ships of over 2,000 tons gross."
The Convention also extends immunity to small rescue craft, which in
the true sense, are not hospital ships but are used in rescue operations.
The protection accorded is not absolute. The Convention uses the langu-
id
age, "So far as operational requirements permit." This language was
used so as to take into account the risks incurred by such craft, because
of their size, in a zone of military operations and to the situation dur-
ing World War II when Germany wanted to use a number of such craft for
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rescue work in the English Channel, (British position was that such
craft would interfer with military security). Small rescue craft, in
order to be protected, must comply with the same requirements as to no-
tification, use, and markings as a hospital ship.
It would seem that the proper test as to whether a particular ship
or rescue craft comes under the protection of the Convention should be
whether the vessel is genuinely equipped for the rescue or transport and
care of the wounded, sick, and shipwrecked; and nether the vessel is en-
gaging in acts of hostility. In other words, a purpose test should be
applied and each case, as to whether or not a particular vessel was in
compliance with the Convention, would depend upon a factual situation.
Belligerents have the right to inspect and search vessels protected by
the Convention; also, if a hospital ship or rescue craft is engaging in
espionage or intelligence work, or for that matter, any unalwful activity,
it looses its immunity. There is no need for a vessel which is legitimately
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engaged In the search, rescue, or treatment of the wounded, sick, and
shipwrecked to be devious or secretive.
The Sea Convention has carried over a provision from the Tenth Con-
vention which provides that should fighting occur on board a warship the
136
sick bays shall be respected and spared as far as possible. The framers
of the Convention acknowledged Cwt the provision was somewhat obsolete.
However, since the provision was in no way objectionable and was in ac-
cordance with the general principles of the Geneva Conventions, requir-
ing respect and protection for hospital facilities, It was included in
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the present convention. This provision pertains to fighting which
might occur aboard a warship. It does not extend immunity to a warship
just because it may have limited hospital facilities. As In the case
of medical establishments ashore, sick bays, and their equipment remain
subject to the laws of warfare. Warships along with their contents may
be destroyed or captured. However, sick bays and their equipment, if
captured, "May not be diverted from their purpose so long as they are re-
quired for the wounded and sick.' 1 However, the belligerent into whose
hands sick bays and medical equipment may h»\/e fallen, can after ensuring
the proper care of the wounded and sick apply the equipment and facilities
to other purposes.
1 . Medical Transports
A medical transport is any vessel used for the transporting of medi
cal equipment and supplies exclusively intended for humanitarian purpo-
189
ses. Such a vessel is entitled to safe passage at sea, provided the
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particulars of the voyage have been notified to, and been approved by
190
the adverse party. The adverse party is not called upon to approve
the shipment - for that is authorized by the Convention. Only the
"particulars regarding the voyage" may be contested, namely, route to
be traveled, date, speed of vessel, and markings. It is not necessary
that a medical transport be permanently assigned to the transport of
medical equipment and supplies; a vessel can be chartered for a single
191
voyage. (This is in contrast to a hospital ship which cannot be
chartered for a particular voyage).
The conveyance of not only medical equipment, but also pharmaceutical
supplies intended for the prevention of disease is authorized by the Con-
vention to be carried by a medical transport. This is a new provision
which did not appear in earlier Conventions. Prior to the Sea Conven-
tion it had been the practice of belligerents to make humanitarian conces-
sions which would have benefited only those victims who were in a v/eakened
condition and thus, for all practical purposes, incapable of doing harm.
This is no longer the case and it seems that the Convention provides that
the fight against suffering must have priority and that prevention is
192better than cure. A medical transport may not be captured nor the
equipment and supplies siezed. However, it may be boarded and inspected
and by agreement between the belligerents, neutral observers may be put
on aboard to verify the equipment and supplies carried.
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2 . Personnel and Crew Member s Aboard Hospital Ships
The Sea Convention provides that the religious, medical, and hos-
pital personnel of hospital ships and their crews must be respected and
protected. Such personnel may not be captured while in the service of
a hospital ship even if there are no wounded, sick, or shipwrecked on
593board. The Convention establishes a rule of absolute exemption from
capture of religious, medical and hospital personnel of hospital ships,
as well as their crews. This is not the case for similar personnel on
lafa
land or for such personnel on other ships. The logical reason for
this rule is the absolute prohibition contained in the Convention against
capture of hospital ships. The operation of hospital ships could be
rendered inoperative if their crews and other personnel could be taken
prisoner, since without such personnel the hospital ship would be unable
to function and would be merely a derelict.
If religious, medical, or hospital personnel, while in the service
of a hospital ship, should come into the hands of an enemy belligerent,
they must be respected and protected under all circumstances. They may
not be deemed prisoners of war and must be sent back to their side as
195
soon as the authorities of the Detaining Power consider it practical.
It 1s to be expected that a belligerent will not allow such personnel to
return at a time when they could convey useful military information to
their own side, but they should be allowed to return as soon as circum-
stances permit.
The distinction between religious, medical, and hospital personnel
aboard a hospital ship and warship is Important as such personnel not In
the service of a hospital ship may be retained to take care of the medical
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and spiritual needs of prisoners of war. Retained personnel may be kept
as long as it is necessary for the care of the wounded and sick. Upon
landing, retained personnel become subject to relevant provisions of the
Land Convention. Retained personnel are not prisoners of war, but must
benefit by all provisions of the Land and P.O.W. Conventions. Retained
personnel are subject to the internal discipline of the prisoner of war
camp in which they are working! however, they may not be required to
perform any work outside their medical and religious duties.
Even though the Convention does permit retention under certain cir-
cumstances of medical and religious personnel, this does not relieve the
Detaining Power of the obligations imposed upon it with regard to the
medical and spiritual needs of prisoners of war. A Detaining Power can-
not transfer its responsibility for the welfare of prisoners of war to
retained personnel.
As has been previously discussed, a warship is entitled to inspect
and search a hospital ship. The warship may require the handing over
ofaany wounded, sick, or shipwrecked personnel found on board. If on
board there are men of the same nationality as the warship, it can re-
lease them from captivity. If there are enemy wounded, sick, and ship-
wrecked the warship can demand their surrender, provided that they are
in a "Fit state to be moved and that the warship can provide adequate
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facilities for necessary medical treatment." * Generally, the right to
surrender is not exercised by a warship, as it is to the advantage of the
warship to leave enemy wounded on board the hospital ship rather than
incur responsibility for their care. However, on several occasions dur-




where the enemy sick and wounded were put ashore and the ships released.
There has been some discussion by writers as to whether or not the right
of surrender is keeping with the humanitarian principles of the Conven-
tion. It is submitted that a belligerent would be reluctant to allow
enemy personnel, often comprising technical grades, and only slightly
wounded and capable of returning to the fighting within a few months to
pass through its hands. However, if a hospital ship is diverted to a
port it would appear that the objections as to adequate facilities would
198
not necessarily be valid.
If medical and religious personnel are to be respected and protected,
a belligerent must be able to recognize them. An attempt has been made
in the Convention to provide a way of identifying such personnel. The
Convention provides that such personnel shall wear affixed to their left
arm a water-resistant armlet bearing the distinctive emblem, issued and
stamped by the proper military authorities. The latter is particularly
essential in order to ensure that the armlet is worn only by those who
are entitled to do so under the Convention. This condition is an essen-
tial one, admitting of no exception. In addition to the armlet the Con-
vention provides that all personnel exclusively engaged in protected ac-
tivities must carry a water resistant identity card. This identity card
199is to state in what capacity the bearer is entitled to protection.
Confiscation of the identity card and armlet by the adverse party
is prohibited. In World Wars I and II personnel engaged in protected
activities sometimes had their armlets s;vd C3rds taken fromtthem. This
was a convenient way for the capturing State to evade its obligations
toward such personnel. Such practices are strictly forbidden and the
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special insignia and identity cards of personnel engaged in protected
activities may be withdrawn only by the military authorities who issued
. 200
the armlet and card.
3. Markings of Hospital Ships
The experience of World War II showed that many of the attacks on
hospital ships were attributable to insufficient markings. Therefore,
in order to make possible, identification of hospital ships at a dis-
tance or from a high altitude, the drafters incorporated within the
Sea Convention fairly detailed provisions pertaining to the exterior
appearances of such ships.
Apart from the national flags, the Convention provides that al! hos-
pital ships should have the same markings. All exterior surfaces of hos-
pital ships are to be painted white with one or more red crosses painted
and displayed on both sides of the hull and on horizontal surfaces. A
white flag with a red cross is to be hoisted as high as possible. At
night and at times of reduced visibility, hospital craft must, subject
to the assent of the power to the conflict under whose control they are,
take the necessary measures to render their painting and distinctive
201
lam sufficiently apparent.'
It is unfortunate that the Convention did not set forth mandatory
requirements pertaining to illumination of hospital ships at night. How-
ever, it was correctly felt that there may be occasions when the tactical
situation prevents illumination of hospital ships at night. Examples
of such tactical situations Tttt (1) a brightly illuminated ship in port
6U

could unintentionally guide enemy bombers to their targets; (2) an illumi-
nated hospital ship passing through defensive minefields might betray the
swept channels,- or (3) illuminated hospital ships following up a night
landing operation could eliminate any elements of surprise. It seems
that the practice regarding an illumination of hospital ships is that ab-
sence of illumination does not deprive such a ship of immunity, It must
accept the risk of accidental attack and accordingly it cannot complain
if it is mistaken for a legitimate target. In other words, the lack of
illumination of a hospital ship is similar to the situation where a hos-
pital ship is close to a legitimate target, the ship does not forfeit its
immunity, but must accept the risk of unintentional, and non-deliberate
a 202damage.
It would seem that the best practice would be that hospital ships
should be brightly illuminated at night except when the tactical situa-
tion required otherwise, then the decision could be made by the local
military commander. Furthermore, as hospital ships may not interfere
wi thtthe military operations of belligerents they may be ordered out of
an area or be prevented from entering an area under attack, for the reason
203
that the presence of the ship would interfer with attacking forces.
Use of the protective emblem is forbidden by all vessels and persons
not authorized by the Convention. The emblem cannot be utilized, except
as provided for in the Convention, for any objective, however commendable,
or for any other humanitarian purpose. This prohibition against wrongful
20*4
use is valid at all times, in peacetime as in war.
The parties to the Convention have agreed to take the measures neces-
sary for the prevention of abuses of the emblem and to enact legislation
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where necessary However the Convention did not prescribe a time limit
for nations to enact protective legislation and needless to say the cur-
rent legislation pertaining to the abuses and the wrongful use of the
red cross emblem in most countries is inadequate. It is noted that legis^
lation no matter how adequate is not sufficient in itself. Once legis-
lation is enacted, a close watch must be kept and wrong doers prosecuted.
For it is only at the cost of unremitting effort that the proper autho-
rities can succeed in defending the red cross emblem and preserve its
protective value and in so doing it must never be forgotten that human
lives may be at stake.
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IV. APPRAISAL AND BECOMMENOATIONS
The Geneva Conventions were not in force as to any of the partici-
pants when the Korean conflict began. However, General MacArthur, the
United Nations Commander in Korea , announced early in the conflict that
207
all United Nations forces would abide by the Geneva Conventions of ]$k$.
In addition, during the course of hostilities, a number of the govern-
ments contributing troops to the United Nations Command in Korea did
ratify the Conventions.
Farly in the conflict the North Korean Government in a reply to a
communication from the Secretary General of the United Nations stated it
was, "Strictly abiding by (the) principles of (the) Geneva Convention in
respect to prisoners of war.*^ While there is no record that the
Chinese Communist regime or the commander of its "volunteers," in Korea,
explicitly undertook to abide by the Conventions, the Foreign Minister of
Communist China did on July 16, 195* inform the Swiss Government that the
209Chinese Government had decided to adhere to the Geneva Conventions of 19**9.
Throughout the course of the Xorean hostilities, both sides repeated-
ly claimed to be scrupulously carrying out the provisions of the P.O.W.
Convention. At no time did either side challenge the applicability of
the Convention or take any position on the basis that the Convention was
not legally applicable. Throughout the fighting and the long months of
negotiating the armistice, both sides publicly assumed that the P.O.W.
Convention was applicable, each side claimed that it was living up to
the Convention and accused the other side of violating it.
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As to the States involved! in the conflict the position regarding the
other three Geneva Conventions was for the most part, identical to that
of the P.O.W. Convention with the exception of the North Korean authori-
ties who limited their undertakings to the P 0«W« Convention. However,
it is emphasized that during the Korean conflict there was little or no
naval action as envisaged by the maritime Convention. Accordingly, the
primary concern was the treatment accorded to sick and wounded on land
and prisoners of war.
Although both sides in the Korean conflict stated they would apply
the P.O.W. Convention, there was a stark difference in the treatment
which the two sides in fact accorded their prisoners of v*ar. The United
Nations Command in compliance with the Sea Convention and similar pro-
visions of the other Geneva Conventions sent lists of captured personnel
to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which in turn
transmitted them to the Communists. The United Nations Command welcomed
representatives of the ICRC into P.O.W, camps from the very beginning of
hostilities and accorded such representatives every facility to carry out
their functions under ths Geneva Convention. On the other Hand, the
Communists while claiming to abide by the P.O.W. Convention, failed to
live up to it in virtually every important respect. Except for a token
list of 110 names transmitted to the ICRC in the early days of the war,
the Communists did not release the names of captured personnel. While
neither side appointed a Protecting Power, the Communists failed to desi-
gnate an impartial humanitarian organisation to oversee the treatment of
captured personnel. In fact, the Communists rejected the persistent
efforts of the ICRC to obtain entry Into Communists P.O.W. camps for
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purpose of inspection. In addition the Communists refused to permit
prisoners to send or receive mail, to report on the health of prisoners,
to give accurate location of prisoner of war camps, to properly mark
prisoner of war camps, and to locate prisoner of war camps away from
legi timate mi H tary targets. However, the most serious violations com-
mitted was the killing, beating, starvation, and general mistreatment
of persons hors de combat by the Communists. It is interesting to note
21
1
that during the Korean War a total of 7* 190 Americans were captured,
of this totaJ approximately 2,730 died in prison camps. This ghastly
death toll - 3^ - was the worst since the Revolutionary War.
The conduct of the Communists during the Korean hostilities, regard*
ing war victims left much to be desired. The attitude of the Communists
to the Geneva Conventions was entirely cynical. They would pick and
choose the provisions of the Conventions they deemed applicable, and
213
then apply a literal method of interpretation.
In regard to the Vietnam conflict the ICRC as early as the spring
of 1965 took the position that, "The hostilities raging at the present
time in Vietnam both North and South of the 17th parallel have assumed
such proportions recently that there can be no doubt they constitute an
armed conflict to which the regulations of humanitarian law as a whole
21^
should be applied," There is no question of doubt that the ICRC was
referring to the applicability of the four Geneva Conventions. However,
as it was in "vorea, the Land and P.O W. Conventions are of primary concern
in the Vietnam conflict. The reason for this can be attributed to the
manner in which the war is being waged.
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Ail the parties (except of course the Viet Cong) are parties to the
four Geneva Conventions. It has been the policy of the United States
and the South Vietnamese to scrupulously abide by the provisions of the
Conventions despite the difficulties presented by an insurgency situa-
tion. In general, the rights of prisoners of war are accorded to all
persons captured under arms* even though it may be doubtful as to whether
certain categories of captives fall within the classification of persons
which may be considered as combatants.
The North Vietnamese have taken a \/ery different attitude toward
captured persons than have its adversaries. The Hanoi government con-
tends that it has no troops in South Vietnam and that the United States
is engaging in a war of aggression. It is also a position of the North
Vietnamese that captive American airmen are war criminals and not en-
titled to the protection of the P.O.W. Convention. Even though the North
Vietnamese profess that the prisoners in its hands are treated humanely,
representatives of the ICRC never have been able to Inspect the North
Vietnamese prison camps. The Communists in Vietnam, just as the Communists
in Korea before them view war victims as tools of psychological and po-
litical warfare. The prisoners they hold are mistreated, well treated,
or released depending upon the political purpose to be served.
It appears that the lesson to be learned from both the Korean and
Vietnam conflicts 1s that the Communists ?lace little value on human
11 fe. The Communists are not interested in protecting persons hors de
combat for reasons of humanity. Their interest in war victims Is that
such individuals can be used as a psychological or political weapon in
forcing an adversary, that is conscious of humanitarian values, to make
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concessions not obtained on the field of battle or through legitimate nego-
tiation. Accordingly, to the Communists persons hors de combat are in a
sense a coMmodi ty which can be used as a negotiating lever.
It is unfortunate that the parties have been reluctant to honor and
abide by the humanitarian principles and purposes set forth in the Geneva
Conventions. In the future there must be a greater emphasis placed on
human rights, humanity, and character by not only States, but also national
and international philanthropic organizations, and private individuals.
As has previously been discussed the four Geneva Conventions grew out of
the harsh experiences encountered .by millions of people during World War
II- Since World v*r II new developments in the waging of war have taken
place, much emphasis is placed on political and psychological warfare and
persons hors de combat have repeatedly been made the subject matter of
this type of warfare. It is true that history can be a guide in prepar-
ing for the future, however, when drafting international agreements such
as the Geneva Conventions of 19**9» it is impossible to provide for all
unforseen contingencies. It was the intention and hope of the ICRC and
the great majority of delegates to the Geneva Conference of 19**9 that the
humanitarian purposes and principles set forth in the Conventions would
influence and prevail in all combat situations and in negotiations per-
taining to hostilities, such has not always been the case particularly
in regard to the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. Nevertheless, the Sea
Convention constitutes a remarkable step forward in the field of human
endeavour and in the development of the law of naval warfare. It con-
stitutes a real advance ir that field of international law which is con-
cerned with human rights and the minimizing of the effects of war and is
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in accordance with that recognition of fundamental human rights found
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights approved by the General As-
sembly of the United Nations on December 10, 19^3. The preamble of that
Declaration states that, Recognition oftthe inherent dignity and of the
equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the
foundation of freedom, justice, and peace." It also warns that, "Disre-
gard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which
215have outraged the conscience of mankind. 1^ *
It is unfortunate that for our day and age the Sea Convention, as
well as the other three Geneva Conventions of 1<&9» represent the high
watermark of humanitarian achievement in the evolution of the law of war.
Hoepfully, the time will come when the nations of the world wi 1 1 be able
to settle their differences through cooperation, understanding, and ne-
gotiations at the conference table. Until such time, international agre-
ements such as the Sea Convention will continue to be of utmost importance
in attempting to minimize the effects and evils of war. However, in order
for the Convention to fulfill its purpose, decision makers in interpret-
ing and applying the Convention must remember that, "No set of words can
apart from context, have any one 'clear', 'unambiguous , or 'literal'
meaning that of itself compulsori ly determines decision whatever the par-
ticular circumstances, may be." It Is unfortunate that none of the
Geneva Conventions establish or recognize any organization which can pro-
vide a binding interpretation of terms of the treaties. Only the member
States a a group can determine the meaning of the Conventions. As a
practical matter, of course, the large number of signatories make It dif-
ficult for the parties to reach authoritative decisions in this manner.
11

As the drafting of the Geneva Conventions was a response to Inadequacies
of earlier treaties and the customary law as brought to light by exper-
iences in World Vter XI it seemed doubtful, taking into consideration
the current state of affairs, that member States would expand the effort
to convene and consider questions of interpretation without a showing
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that the Conventions in some way were unsatisfactory. Thus, if the
Conventions are to survive and be effective they must be treated as
having a potential for growth similar to that which has characterized
the customary rules of warfare. The object of interpreting the Conven-
tions must be to determine how their purposes may be best achieved in the
light of changing conditions. The specific purposes of the Geneva Con-
ventions require that ambiguities be resolved in favor of the widest pos-
sible coverage. The goals of mitigating the excesses of war and provid-
ing humane treatment for war victims requires a broad and flexible con-
struction of the Conventions. Accordingly, a rational theory of in-
terpretation must be employed. "A rational theory of interpretation...
(recognizes) that treaty words acquire meaning in specific controversies
only from context and in terms of the major purposes and demands of the
parties..." There is no doubt that the major purpose and demands of
the Conventions are humanitarian in character - for the benefit of those
who become victims of war to prevent abuse by inhumane treatment - and
it is submitted that anyone of good faith is capable of applying the pro-
visions of the Conventions correctly, rovided he Is acquainted with the
basic principles, h any problems in interpretation can be avoided by an
endeavor to fulfill the purpose of the Conventions rather than the literal
application of individual sections of a Convention. It must be remembered
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that the Conventions were drafted to protect Individuals and not to
serv<? State interests, A remark of the International Court of Justice
with regard to the Genocide Convention of l$A3 applies with equa i force
here:
In such a convention the
contracting States do not
>»ave any interests of their
own: they merely have,
one and a 1 1 , a common i n-
terest, namely, the accom-
pli shr><ent of thoi>e high
purposes which are the
r si son tl etre of the con-
vention. Consequently,
In a convention of this
type one cannot speak of
individual advantages or
disadvantages to States,
or of the maintenance of
a perfect contractual bal-
ance between rights and
duties. The high ideals
i«!*ich inspired the Conven-
tion provide, by virtue of
the cuuinon wi 1 1 of the
parties, the foundation
and ailMM of «*!! its pro-
visions »22€
The Sea Convention starts from the hypothesis that law is a primary
element of civilization. Even though war is a fact of the contemporary
world, it must be limited by law. Its aim is to safeguard respect for the
human person, the fundamental rights of man and his dignity as a human being,
in the hope that universal peace may one day be established. Until such
time, and as long as there is war the Sea Convention, as well as the other
three Geneva Conventions, prescribe a minimum standard of treatment which
must be accorded to war victims. However, regardless of the cjrandoise
provisions and rules set forth in the Conventions and the great number of
7<*

countries which claim to adhere to the Geneva Conventions, they are
useless unless the people of the world are made aware of the basic pro-
visions set forth in these Conventions. Humanitarian law affects nearly
everyone, and in a modern war, where the fighting takes place everywhere
(as in Vietnam) anyone may be faced wi th a situation in which he has to
either apply or invoke one of the Conventions. Accordingly, States have
a duty to publicize and distribute the Conventions as widely as possible-
This can be done by encouraging courses of instruction to both the mili-
tary and civilian population in the humanitarian law of the Geneva Con-
ventions. Currently, many governments provide some instruction to their
military forces, but for the most part seem to neglect their civilian
populations. Institutions of learning and local Chapters of the Red Cross
should be encouraged to offer courses and programs of study which could
include the humanitarian law of the Conventions.
The complexities are many when it comes to international agreements
regulating warfare. Policy makers are faced not only with the task of
developing, and drafting international humanitarian agreements, but also
with enforcing compliance wi th them during periods of turmoil. Widespread
dissemination of the Conventions would facilitate the task of policy makers;
it would also spread the principles of humanity and would help to develop
a spirit of peace among the peoples of the world.
Prior to the Geneva Conventions neither the customary law nor the
conventional law, relating to the law of war, required States to exercise
a universal penal jurisdiction over those who violated the law of war.
The Geneva Conventions do not provide for compulsory universal penal
jurisdiction in respect to all violations of the Conventions; only those
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offenses enumerated as "grave breaches:" but, does make it mandatory for
contracting parties to legislate so that effective penal sanctions ma/
be imposed on all perpetrators of "grave breaches" regardless of national'
ity. The significance of this measure in the development of the law of
war is that national courts will impose sanctions for the violations of
the laws of war not only on their nationals, but individuals of any na-
tionality within their territorial jurisdiction.
It is submitted that the procedure set forth in the Conventions for
the trial of persons accused of committing a "grave breach" is satisfac-
tory, especially as it relates to a States own nationals, However, some
of the same criticisms which were leveled against many of the war crimes
trials following World War IX could also be made against the system pro-
vided for in the Conventions when a victor is trying nationals of a de-
feated power for alleged war crimes. If past experience is precedent,
war crimes trials of nationals of a defeated State by a victor State will
take place at the conclusion of hostilities and only when there has been
a decisive victory. Thus, there would be the criticism that the victor's
court is dispensing justice and making the determination as to whether
or not a "grave breach" had been committed. It is suggested that this
criticism could be avoided by having the courts of a neutral State take
jurisdiction of any such cases or in the alternative; if for any reason
a neutral State did not take jurisdiction; the victor State could retain
jurisdiction, but use jurists from a neutral State. This procedure could
be followed, without being in violation of the Conventions, and in the
writer's opinion it would certainly be in keeping with the humani tarian
purposes of the Conventions.
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It is unfortunate that in drafting treaties pertaining to the law of
war the drafters write rules based upon factual situations of a past war.
This is most ably illustrated in article 3 of each of the Conventions
which speak in terms of a '"conflict of an international character" and
" conflict not of an international character." It would have been better
if the Conventions spoke in terms of only a single armed conflict. Thus,
some of the problems of whether or not the Conventions would be applicable
in particular situations, such as Vietnam, could be avoided.
The writer realizes that historically States have jealously guarded
their sovereignty and resented interference in their domestic affairs.
However, in the past 30 years the international law of human rights has
developed to the point that gross violations of human rights are viola-
tions of international law and no longer come within the exclusive domes-
tic jurisdiction of States. This is of great importance regarding the
law of war and the application of the Geneva Conventions. In this day
and age civil wars are so easily turned into international wars. This
is particularly true in the present state of tension and conflict which
currently exists in many parts of the world community. Article 3> like
the rest of the articles of the Conventions, is concerned with individuals
and the physical and moral treatment which they as human beings are en-
titled, If does not affect the legal or political treatment which rebels
may receive if the rebellion should fail. Accordingly, it is recommended
that the Conventions should be applied when the following criteria are met:
that the party in revolt against the dejure government possesses an or-
ganized military force; an authority responsible for its acts, has the
means of respecting and ensuring respect for the Convention and that the
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goverttment is obliged to hove recourse to its regular military forces.
If world order and protection of fundamental human rights is to have
any meaning it must be realized that suffering and humiliation of human
bein-s must not be tolerated and that humanitarian conventions such as
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